Jacques Ellul, Propaganda, and the Possibility for Changing the Peace Articles of the Japanese Constitution

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Abstract

This paper applies the theoretical perspective of Jacques Ellul, as set out in Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes (1965/1962), to examine why the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), despite years of effort, has had little success in shifting public opinion regarding constitutional reform, particularly in regards to changes to the Article 9 provisions. Ellul argues that propaganda is the use of media to transmit an ideological position and transform this ideology into a societal myth. Ellul rejects association of myth with falsehood and, instead, considers the term closer to the Greek origin as denoting narrative. Ellul's theoretical model provides a way to understand why the efforts of subsequent LDP governments have made scant progress in swaying public opinion.

Keywords: Jacques Ellul, propaganda, Article 9, ideology

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At the opening of the Japanese Diet on February 3, 2016, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo made an explicit call for alternation of the Japanese constitution, particularly changing Article 9, the article that includes, its second paragraph, the statement that "Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained" ("Abe explicit," 2016). This remains a long-held desire of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), but one that is not supported by the majority of the Japanese population, even according to those within the LDP. Komura Masahiko, vice president of the LDP, acknowledged this in July 2016 when he told reporters, "Despite our wishes, we can’t do so. We won’t do what we can’t," citing both the lack of support in the Diet, where a two-thirds majority is required to initiate changes to the constitution, and the lack of support from the general public as reasons the government would not ask for changes to Article 9 ("LDP vice chief negative," 2016). Though the headlines that followed the opening of the fall 2016 Diet session suggested that constitutional change is imminent (Osaki, 2016a), the likelihood of changes to the peace provisions of Article 9 remains distant as it seems clear that the LDP will give "priority to winning support from the opposition side on less controversial amendments" (Osaka, 2016b, p. 1).

The actions by Abe’s government, and other previous LDP governments, are part of the long-held desire by the ruling LDP to revise the constitution, particularly the provisions in Article 9 (e.g., Maruyama, 1969/1963; Oi, 1961; Quigley, 1956; Sakamoto, 1960). This desire has not been restricted to that of the LDP-led Japanese government. The U.S. government began to push for changes immediately following the Constitution’s enactment, seeing it as necessary in the post-war era (Rowe, 1947). In 1947, Rowe indicated that “without national armed forces a future Japan . . . would be powerless to carry out all possible responsibilities for the preservation of peace . . . under the United Nations Charter” (p. 32). From the post-war period forward, the rearmament of Japan proceeded, with U.S. encouragement, under the guise of self-defense, but Article 9 remained unchanged. This was “not because a politically constrained right was forced to acquiesce to demands from the pacifist left, but because conservatives within the LDP were divided on the issue” (Samuels, 2004, p. 5).

The most recent push for revisions can be traced to a ceremony held to mark the 50th anniversary of the LDP on November 22, 2005. This was when then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announced that the government would seek to revise the Japanese constitution as the restrictions of Article 9 prevented Japan from fulfilling its international obligations (“Jimin keittou,” 2005). Over the next 10 years, subsequent LDP administrations worked to find ways around the provisions of Article 9 and pressed for constitutional revisions, with Abe’s simply the
most recent ("Abe’s drive," 2016). Osaki (2016b) points out that the work of the Commission on the Constitution recently has been broadly framed to consider a number of constitutional provisions that might be in need of change, including allowing the government to declare a state of emergency, in order to garner support from the opposition. However, the stated goal of the LDP remains to eliminate the restrictions imposed by Article 9, which would allow Japan to have a military with full capabilities. In the eyes of some, including those leading various LDP governments from the post-Occupation period to the present, revision of Article 9 would allow Japan to regain the status as a “normal” country, with all the rights of “sovereignty” – including a military that can project its force overseas (e.g., Itoh, 2001; Nishi, 2005). Since the Koizumi administration, Japan has slowly expanded the range of SDF activities, at first by serving in support roles when conflict had ended and peace needed to be maintained ("Upgrading SDF's Overseas," 2006) and then to deployments in areas of conflict, ostensibly in support roles, in places such as Afghanistan and South Sudan ("Broadening SDF," 2015; Ministry of Defense, 2014b, 2016b), with successive governments arguing that this is essential for international peace and Japan’s own security (Ministry of Defense, 2014a; "SDF Personnel," 2014). Hook and Son (2016) suggest that Japan has created a “new international humanitarian identity” within the framework of its identity as peaceful state. This moves Japan further into the realm outlined by Inoguchi and Bacon (2006) of having status as ordinary power, following the British model.

This slow expansion has not been without its critics (e.g., Narusawa, 2014), and these criticisms seem to carry more weight with the general public than the support of LDP administrations. In spite of the LDP’s efforts to revise the constitution, public opinion polls indicate that the Japanese public, though they may support the inclusion of provisions that “stipulate the maintenance of the Self-Defense Force in the Constitution,” in 2005, more than 60 percent indicated that revision of Article 9 itself is “uncalled for” (Sakamoto, 2005, p. 2). Though the numbers in opposition have fluctuated, a majority of Japanese citizens remained opposed to changes to Article 9 ("Asahi Poll: Majority," 2016). Were the proposed constitutional revision to be enacted, Japan would no longer have the distinction of having “the world’s oldest unrevised constitution” (Hook & McCormack, 2001), but even the LDP admits that the actual chances of this occurring are unlikely at any time soon as most Japanese citizens remain opposed ("Asahi Poll: Majority of Voters," 2016).

**Ellul, Social Psychology, & Peace Nationalism**

The reason why amendment to Article 9 remains opposed by citizens, despite being a goal of subsequent LDP administrations for nearly 70 years, can be understood when examined through the lens of Jacques Ellul’s (1965/1962) theoretical model of propaganda. This model provides an intersection between the theories of the construction of social meaning, offered by Althusser (1971), Bourdieu (1991), and Gramsci (1971), by linking social meaning to
the construction of societal myths through a dominant ideology (Ellul, 1965/1962), which in Ellulian terms is the use of “propaganda” and “technique.” Ellul views propaganda as a “sociological phenomenon, in the sense that it has its roots and reasons in the need of the group that will sustain it” (p. 121, emphasis mine). Ellul’s model relies on these two concepts. Propaganda is the acceptance by media makers and opinion leaders of the “truth” of an ideology. That is, the people who have the power to disseminate a message believe in the message, often ignoring evidence that is contrary to the ideological position. Technique is the ability of these media makers, who are the propagandists, to use media to transmit this ideology. Propaganda does not work unless those transmitting the message are believers in the ideology. Over time, the propagandists transform ideology into mythology. Media, therefore, operate as the site for the creation of societal myths. Anderson (1991) followed this same logic when he arrived at the conclusion that print-capitalism was a necessary condition for the construction of national identity and “the rise of national consciousness” and the emergence of the nation state (p. 39).

Central to Ellul’s argument is that the emergence of the modern state is “the product of the invasion of technique throughout society” which requires “a form of communication Ellul described as propaganda” (Moore, 1998, p. 129). Ellul’s perspective on society flows from Emile Durkheim’s (1966/1902) concern for anomie and the isolation of the individual by modern society. Durkheim defines anomie as a state of deregulation which leaves individuals “without a curb to regulate” their passions (Outhwaite, Bottomore, Gellner, Nisbet, & Touraine, 1993, p. 19), or more simply as the lack of moral guidance by society (Gerber & Macionis, 2010, p. 97). Technique, like anomie, isolates individuals and concentrates power through use of propaganda and mass media. Ellul’s (1965/1962) discussion of how “the propagandist tries to create myths by which man will live, which respond to his sense of the world” (p. 31), and use these to direct social behavior, moves myth-making from the realm of the ancient past to that of the active present. The technique used to transform ideology into myth requires mass media; they are the site for the creation of myths. Ellul’s definition, with its echoes of Joseph Campbell (1988/1949), leads to a consideration of how “the propagandist tries to create myths by which man will live, which respond to his sense of the world” (p. 31). The technique used to create myth, or to transform the ideology, require the use of mass media. Through this, “propaganda . . . can eventually turn ideology into myth” (p. 117). The work of the propagandist, like that of Bourdieu’s (1991) political professionals who impose “their own interests as the interests of those whom they represent” (p. 175), is to move ideology to mythology. Ellul “draws to our attention the fundamental cognitive power of myths whose origins lie at the basis of human consciousness” (Karim, 2003, p. 72). It is this ability that makes the work of the propaganda hard to detect (Swenson, 2009, 2014). This is because it requires time, both to determine if the shift from ideology to mythology has occurred and then to consider how fully the new
mythology has been accepted into the fabric of society.

Myth-making, as postulated by Ellul (1965/1962), includes multiple dimensions of propaganda, including vertical and horizontal propaganda (propaganda between and within class), rational and irrational propaganda (logical and emotional appeals within propaganda), agitation and integration propaganda (propaganda to insight action and propaganda to build unity), and political and social propaganda (propaganda to direct action toward either political or social goals) (pp. 61-87). Agitation propaganda appeals to those who see propaganda primarily as an instrument to incite an immediate response. Integration propaganda, however, is seen as more effective as it based on the “assumption that the decisive point in an individual’s action is not at the level of their conscious will but rather in the way that they see and understand the world” (DeMeulemeester, 1994, p. 98). In short, integration propaganda is evolutionary, not revolutionary, setting out a preferred position that becomes established over time. This is the transformation of ideology into mythology. Studies of the use of propaganda provide insight into the application of political, social, and integration propaganda within the Japanese media (e.g., H. Dodson, 2002; Havens, 2007; Kamanishi, 2002; McBride, 2006; Yoshimi, 2002). These studies suggest that integrative propaganda is a long-term process, not an immediate “magic bullet” that changes attitudes, providing further support for adoption of Ellul’s perspective.

The Myth of Peace Nationalism

This returns me to the discussion of the Article 9 provisions, Japanese identity, and the likelihood for immediate change to the Constitution. Before the end of the Occupation in 1952, the U.S. government was already encouraging the Japanese government to rearm in order to serve as a bulkhead against the Communist threat (e.g., Maruyama, 1969/1963; Oi, 1961; Quigley, 1956; Sakamoto, 1960). However, each time an LDP government has pushed for revision, the public and opposition have pushed back.

In 2005, the announcement by Koizumi was met with an immediate response from those opposed to revision of the peace provisions. Democratic Party Diet member Fujisue Kenzo (2005) questioned Koizumi’s decision and argues against any changes to Article 9 in order to “avoid getting into any future wars”. The position held by Fujisue, who served in the House of Councilors, the legislative body of the Diet similar to the U.S. House of Representatives, echoes that of others who want to maintain “Japan’s pacifist culture.” One effect of Koizumi’s 2005 announcement, and each of the subsequent pushes for changes to Article 9, has been to galvanize public opposition. In 2005, Japanese Nobel Laureate Oe Kensaburo and other prominent academics spoke against the proposal at a Tokyo symposium, with the criticism centered primarily on the need to retain Japan’s peaceful character (“Jimin kaikenan,” 2005). The opposition remains opposed to revision of Article 9, but is now receptive to changes.
to other provisions (Osaki, 2016b). Similarly, public opinion polls have indicated that the
Japanese public generally supports bringing the constitution in line with the current reality,
particularly by including provisions that allow for the maintenance and deployment of the
SDF, but opposes any change to Article 9. In 2005, 42 percent of respondents said that no
revision was needed (“64% say,” 2005). In 2014, this had increased to 48 percent, and in 2016,
55 percent of respondents indicated that they were opposed ("Asahi poll: Majority," 2016). The
response to proposals to revise Article 9 provides support for those who claim that there exists
in Japan a “peace nationalism” (McVeigh, 2004, p. 207) that has become central to the modern
identity of Japan. The Japanese imagine themselves as a pacifistic community.

Japan’s identification with the idea of being a “peaceful” nation has been found to
be a central trope of national identity in Japanese society. Swenson (2009) provided an
examination of how this identity became central in the postwar period using Ellul’s (1965/1962)
model. This work traced the idea of peace nationalism from the post-occupation period, where
it served first as an extension of policies implemented by the Occupation government, to an
ideology supported by media makers, and then an accepted mythology in Japanese society.
Karasawa Minoru (2002) points out that “expelling the wartime image of an imperialist state
and achieving a new form of national identity has been a top-priority goal” (p. 663). Central
to this new national identity is the peace article, which provides support for the idea of Japan
as “a peace-loving homogenous state to replace the prewar militaristic multi-national empire”
(Oguma, 2002, p. 299). The construction of this image, central to the postwar image of the
in many ways shows the successful application of Anderson’s (1991/1983) concepts in the
construction of a modern imaginary community. In Japan’s postwar period, the nation was re-
imagined in terms of peace and homogeneity.

**Peace and the Postwar Constitution**

Before considering the ways in which official nationalism has created a re-imagination of
Japanese identity, it is important to look at the postwar constitution and its imposition. Adopted
during the post-World War II American Occupation, the constitution begins in a way not
unfamiliar to Americans. In the English version, it reads “We, the Japanese people,” and then
goes on to place sovereignty with the people and exercised by their elected representatives. It
is the continuation that sets the tone for the central notion of peace nationalism as it developed
during the postwar period. The second paragraph of the preamble reads:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high
ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security
and existence, trusting the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We
desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation
of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all
time from the earth. We recognize that all the peoples of the world have the right to live in
peace, free from fear and want. (“Birth of,” 2004)
A precise English translation of the opening preamble, or any part of the constitution, is
remarkably easy as the postwar constitution was dictated by the American occupation
forces and then translated into Japanese. Though much has been written about Japanese
involvement in the promulgation of the constitution, it is important to remember that the
document itself emerged during a one-week brainstorming session held by a panel appointed
by General MacArthur that did not include any Japanese citizens (Hook & McCormack, 2001).
The major portions of the constitution, which was formally promulgated on November 3, 1946
and enacted on May 3, 1947, were based on two documents: the Potsdam Declaration of July

One justification for revision is that the constitution does not reflect the sentiments of
modern Japanese because it was a dictated document. Koizumi and the LDP maintain it is
time to bring all aspects of the constitution in line with modern Japan, but the primary focus
of the revision is Article 9. The U.S. government wants it relaxed. Japan’s neighbors insist it be
maintained. The Japanese themselves are fiercely divided about whether it should be retained,
modified, or eliminated. Found in Chapter 2: Renunciation of War, Article 9, the so-called
“peace article,” reads:

(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the national and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state
will not be recognized. (“Birth of,” 2004)

The provisions of Article 9 led Japan to envision an alternate way to create an “imagined
community” that did not rely upon expansive warfare or a strong military identity to bind the
nation. The necessity of undertaking this project lies in the need for any nation to do the daily
maintenance that lies “near the surface of contemporary life” to maintain a national identity
(Billig, 1995, p. 93). For an imagined community to exist, it needs to have a framework to hang
the imagination upon.

Peace as National Identity

The renunciation of war that was central to the demands of the American-led forces
following Japan’s surrender has become a central feature of modern Japanese nationalism.
Japan has, in essence, found a way to reconcile its prewar military expansion with a postwar
peace identity through print nationalism (Anderson, 1991/1983) and the gradually acceptance
of an ideological position as a social myth following Ellul’s Propaganda Model (Swenson, 2009). Maruyama Masao (1950), in his analysis of the rise of modern nationalism in Europe and in Asia, wrote of the general paucity of cultural pride in Japan when compared with the West and warned that blindly following the U.S. anti-Communist stance and equating this with nationalism might turn Japan into a “police state” (p. 25). His stance has been interpreted as anti-military, which reflects the general opinion “shared all along the political spectrum in postwar Japan” (Berger, 1993, p. 137). Though right-wing elements exist in Japan and SDF forces are dispatched overseas to war-ravaged regions, various polls of public opinion clearly indicate that a Japanese myth of pacifism remains strong (e.g., “Asahi poll,” 2016; Beer & Maki, 2002; Dower, 1999; Fujisue, 2005; Hook & McCormack, 2001; Hook & Son, 2013), one which emerged from this anti-military stance.

Promulgation of the postwar constitution and its acceptance by the Japanese people, particularly the internalization of the peace principles, can be considered a successful application of the official nationalism Anderson (1991/1983) discusses. The establishment in the Japanese psyche of idea of  wa, translated as either ‘peace’ or ‘harmony’, as a national characteristic and a central feature of Japanese society clearly has its roots in the ways in which the Occupation and Japanese bureaucracies implemented policies based upon the postwar constitution, particularly those dealing with education and press control, which attempted to expunge imperial and military nationalism from the Japanese discussion of the national character and replace these with an identity of peace nationalism (see Hook & McCormack, 2001, for a discussion formation of the postwar constitution). Once the constitution was promulgated, these bureaucracies supported its provisions and, as study of Ellul’s (1965/1962) Propaganda model shows, eventually accepted the ideology of peace nationalism though it had been imposed by the Occupation government. Once an ideology is accepted, it can rapidly be transformed, in Ellul’s model, into mythology.

That this was done in Japan following the steps outlined in Ellul’s (1965/1962) model can be seen in the way a national identity of peace was stressed by postwar policies in education and media representations (Oguma, 2002), using what Althusser (1971) refers to as the Ideological State Apparatus or Gramsci (1971) state hegemony, to transmit the “new” national ideology. This ideology was couched in terms such as ‘peace’, ‘harmony’, ‘unified’, ‘homogeneity’, and ‘cooperation.’ The media representations, in particular, clearly make use of the process Jacques Ellul (1965/1962) refers to as the “propaganda of integration” (p. 36), which resembles the use of print-capitalism Anderson (1991/1983) considers necessary for “the rise of national consciousness” (p. 39). Though it could be argued that Japan already had a national identity, one that Anderson sees as having been established during the Meiji era, the creation of a new, non-military national identity was clearly a project the Occupation forces wanted to encourage, as well as one that the Japanese population, wearied by war,
readily accepted. “Propaganda cannot create something out of nothing. It must attach itself to a feeling, an idea; it must build on a foundation already present in the individual” (Ellul, 1965/1962, p. 36). The feeling to which the new nationalism attached was primarily the public’s repudiation of the prewar militarism.

Part of this repudiation was the sentiment that has come together into a widely expressed national sentiment – “No more Hiroshimas.” George Totten and Kawakami Tamio (1964), tracing the rise of the Gensuikyô (Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), indicate that “the widespread but unorganized peace sentiment . . . initially aided in making acceptable the American Occupation and its early reforms” (p. 833). This peace sentiment quickly coalesced into a peace movement centered on the repudiation of nuclear weapons. Given the destruction caused by the two atomic bombs, it might be supposed that the connection between the peace identity and the anti-nuclear movement emerged during the Occupation. However, it was not until after the Occupation ended in 1952 that the Japanese public learned of the full extent of the destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This occurred when the Asahi Graph published “a mass of photographs . . . on the seventh anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing” (p. 834). The horrific images in the photographs, combined with the radiation poisoning of Japanese fishermen in 1954 during one of the U.S. nuclear weapons’ tests on the Bikini islands, led to the movement’s creation–initially along nationalist terms (p. 837). (For discussion of the Bikini Island nuclear tests, of which there were 23 between 1948 and 1958, see e.g., Dahlman, Mykkeltveit, & Haak, 2009; Weisgall, 1994). The media’s role in helping to establish the peace movement, and peace as a national identity, can be seen in both the support it was required to give under the censorship restrictions of the Occupation, which emphasized repudiation of the military era, and the emphasis placed on the horrors associated with nuclear weapons, and by extension all military, after the Occupation.

The national identity of peace, therefore, needs to be seen as linked not only to the defeat of the imperial, militaristic government and the imposition of Article 9 and the other aspects of the “peace” constitution, but also to the nearly universal reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This memory is kept alive through regular lectures from survivors and their descendants, visits to Hiroshima or Nagasaki by students, and ceremonies held annually since 1955 to remember the victims in both locations (for a discussion of remembrance and forgetting, see, among others, Dahlman, Mykkeltveit, & Haak, 2009; Giamo, 2003; Orr, 2001; Seaton, 2007). This memory also helped to turn Japan from the position of “losers of war” into ‘winners of peace’” (Dower, 1999, p. 494). McVeigh (2004) comments that peace nationalism is driven by a mix of repentance (denunciation of war), national pride (“only Japan has a war-renouncing constitution”), a type of self-centered nationalism expressed as “one country pacifism,” . . . and a naïve denial of international realpolitik . . . . Peace national may also be thought of as a type of renovationist nationalism that afforded
Japan a new sense of national purpose for the postimperial era. (p. 207)

Wording it more strongly, Shimizu Naoko (2003) terms this as creating “the half-baked myth that all Japanese were victims of pre-war and wartime militarists” (p. 115). She sees the use of Hiroshima as “providing the uncontested narrative for the rebirth of postwar Japan as pacifists” and allowing the nation to forget their role in perpetrating the war (p. 111). This process has effectively placed Japanese imperialism in the “polluted” past, one occupied by a militaristic “other” that had no relationship with current Japan, versus the purity of the pacifistic present, a use of Ellul’s (1965/1962) model. This is much the same as how Mary Douglas (2002/1966) sees societies protecting themselves from the danger of contamination—in Japan’s case the contamination of rearmament. Together, we can consider this as leading to a “radical realignment of national discourses around the ideas of pacifism and democracy” (Wilson, 2002, p. 15).

Japanese memory of war and its reconstruction during the postwar period, provides an example collective memory, which Edward Said (1978) suggests is framed by the present, distorted by time, and then selectively employed for the representation of identity, nationalism, power and authority, and the use of this memory to further a mythology as outlined by Ellul (1965/1962). In Japan, collective memory has allowed the re-imagination in terms of peace and homogeneity of a unified Japanese state. This was clearly a move in Japanese historiography (e.g. Brownlee, 1997; Lie, 2001) that reflects Anderson’s (1991/1983) comment that “all profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias” (p. 204). The amnesias that took place in Japan regarding its role in the Pacific War and its colonization of its Asian neighbors should not be considered unique, though they have been taken to an extreme in the re-imagination of a peaceful Japan. It also shows the application of the technique discussed by Ellul (1965/1962) to transform an ideology into an accepted social mythology: the myth of peace nationalism.

**Conclusion**

As has been discussed elsewhere, “the work of propaganda is not immediate” (Swenson, 2009). The transformation of Japanese ideology from that the mythology of being a peaceful nation took time. The Japanese Constitution’s Article 9 provisions moved from being an expedient ideology in the aftermath of the war, an ideology imposed by the U.S. Occupation Government, to an accepted part of Japanese social mythology. This process is ongoing, both within Japan and overseas, as can be seen in various movements that stress Japan’s peaceful role in the world. For Eisnarsen and Downey (2009), these words are “a gift of hope that arose from the ashes of World War II, [that] can further transform the geopolitical landscape in the 21st century” (p. 4). Others have voiced similar sentiments.
The success of the transformation of Japanese ideology into a mythology of Japan as a peaceful nation can most clearly be seen in the reactions of Japanese to proposals for revising the postwar constitution and their responses to surveys on national identity. Though there is generally approval for the move to bring the constitution in line with the reality through incorporation of provisions allowing for maintenance of the SDF, there are still strong feelings that no change should be made to the peace provisions of Article 9 ("Asahi Poll: Majority, 2016; Sakamoto, 2005). Muto Ichiyo (2000, 2001) indicates that Japan’s peace stance was formulated in response to [the Cold War]: peace by mitigating the East-West nuclear confrontation through reconciliation, and support for the struggles of Third World peoples against dictatorial regimes and for human rights. (2000, p. 111)

Peace nationalism is likely to remain the dominant mythology of Japan for the foreseeable future, unless international conditions force an immediate shift in the public’s consciousness. That these amnesias were carried out and remain in the public imagination supports Ellul’s theoretical model for the transmission of an ideology and its acceptance, over time, as a societal mythology (Ellul, 1965/1962; Swenson, 2009).

In short, it will take time for the Abe government, or any Japanese administration seeking to eliminate the Article 9 provisions from the Constitution, to shift this mythology and introduce a counter-ideology into the public consciousness. Ellul (1965/1962) states that propaganda must be built on facts, but it requires time for the ideology to become durable, but once it is turned into social mythology it becomes more difficult for the public to reject. The LDP-led government’s plans to revise the constitution run counter to the wishes of the majority of the Japanese public, which opposes revision to Article 9. Revision to Article 9 remains unlikely.

Instead, we can expect to see the continued process of re-imagining Japanese identity in terms of “projecting ‘peace nationalism’ overseas” as predicted by examination of Japan’s societal myths in light of Ellul’s theories (Swenson, 2009), further emphasis on the SDF’s humanitarian role, and little done to actually change Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.

Notes

1. In keeping with the guidelines of the Society of Writers, Editors and Translators (SWET, 1998), I am using Japanese name order: family name before given name.

2. For details on Japan’s overseas deployments of the SDF, see the annual Ministry of Defense white papers, 2005 to 2016, available on the MOD website. URL: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html

3. Hook & McCormack (2001) provide a detailed explanation regarding the controversy surrounding the 1946 constitution. A source for primary documents, in English and Japanese, regarding the writing of the postwar constitution can be found online at the Japanese National Diet Library ("Birth of," 2004).

4. Gensuikyô is the Japanese abbreviation for Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyôgikai (Japan Council
Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), which campaigns for peace in a variety of ways. Recently, it has led anti-Iraq war campaigns and was one of Japan’s civil society representatives at the 2004 World Social Forum in Brazil (“2005: 60 – Nihon,” 2005).

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Pacific Relations.


in Urasoe, Okinawa, organized by the People’s Plan Study Group, Tokyo jointly with Focus on the Global South.


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