

NPT Review Process and Nuclear Disarmament

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NPT 再検討プロセスと核軍縮

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to examine the importance of nuclear disarmament in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process and for international peace and security. In the 21st century, there have been many challenges to the NPT regime, and many measures have been taken to cope with them. However, they are not effective enough. On the other hand, as nuclear deterrence is not reliable anymore, some argue for a world free of nuclear weapons. Based on the analysis of these issues, the author argues for the importance of nuclear disarmament in order to strengthen the NPT regime and build a more peaceful and secure international community, showing practical steps for nuclear disarmament.

Key words : Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear disarmament, a world free of nuclear weapons, NPT review process, three pillars of the NPT

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抄 録

本稿の目的は、核不拡散条約（NPT）再検討プロセスおよび国際の平和と安全保障における核軍縮の重要性を検討するものである。21世紀に入り核不拡散体制に対するさまざまな挑戦が生じ、それに対応するための措置がとられてきたが、十分な成果を挙げていない。また最近、核抑止はもはや有効でないという理由から「核兵器のない世界」が提案され広く議論されている。それらの分析に基づき、核不拡散体制を強化し、またより平和で安全な世界を構築するために核軍縮が必要であることを主張し、核軍縮のための実際的措置を提案する。

キーワード：核不拡散条約、核軍縮、核兵器のない世界、NPT再検討会議、NPTの三本柱

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Introduction

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime is a cornerstone of current nuclear order and peace and security in the international community. The purpose of this article is to examine the importance of nuclear disarmament in the NPT review process and for international peace and security, taking into account recent international transactions.

First, this article will explain the NPT and its review conferences, and then second, examine new challenges to the NPT and responses to them, in particular, the U.S. attitudes. Third, it will introduce a bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by Mr. Schultz and others and a follow-up to the proposal, and fourth, survey reactions to the proposal including the current U.S. candidates for the upcoming presidential election. Finally this article will argue that nuclear disarmament is indispensable both for strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and for making a more peaceful and secure world, showing practical steps for nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Review

Fundamental Structure of the NPT: Three Pillars

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 1, 1970. Its main and direct purpose involved in Articles I, II and III is to prevent additional states from possessing nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear-weapon states, that is, the U.S., Russia, the U.K, France, and China as defined in the treaty.

In a sense, it is a discriminatory treaty because the five states are permitted to possess nuclear weapons while all other states are prohibited to possess them. In order to compensate for this discrimination and also induce non-nuclear-weapon states to join the treaty, the treaty includes the inalienable right of all parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Article IV and the obligation to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in Article VI.

In addition, the treaty provides for a review conference five years after its entry into force in Article VIII and an extension conference twenty-five years after its entry into force in Article X, in order to alleviate non-nuclear-weapon states' anxiety about the discriminatory nature of the treaty.

Although the main purpose of the treaty is nuclear non-proliferation, the general acceptance and survivability of the treaty rests on promises on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. These three pillars of the NPT as its fundamental structure are generally agreed¹, and the importance of balanced, full and non-selective application and implementation of the treaty has been stressed².

NPT Review Conferences

The 1995 review conference was held together with the extension conference and adopted some decisions. The decision 3 on an indefinite extension was agreed without a vote as a package with the decision 1 on strengthening the review process for the treaty and the decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as well as the resolution on the Middle East³. The review process was strengthened by increasing the frequency of the review and by increasing the contents of the review.

The importance of the following measures in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI was agreed:

- (a) The completion of the negotiation on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996.
- (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).
- (c) The determined pursuit of efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons.

The 2000 review conference succeeded in adopting a final document by consensus⁴. In the final document, the conference agreed on 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI. It includes an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon state to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as well as the entry into force of the CTBT, negotiation of a FMCT, nuclear reduction, reduction of operational status of nuclear weapons, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policy and other measures⁵.

Contrary to the two previous conferences, the 2005 review conference was full of confrontation even before its opening. The agenda was not agreed until almost the end of the session, mainly because of the difference of opinions on whether the agenda should include the reference to the documents adopted at the previous conferences. The atmosphere of the conference was also very confrontational and strong criticism was often exchanged among participants. The conference was a failure, with no agreement obtained⁶.

Now, we are in the review process for the 2010 review conference and its first and second sessions of the preparatory committee were held in 2007 and 2008 respectively. After the disappointing failure of the 2005 review conference, states are trying to have a successful conference in 2010 and the atmosphere at the recent two sessions was better than before, but much efforts will be needed to fulfill the purposes of the NPT.

New Challenges to the NPT and Responses to Them

New Challenges to the NPT

The NPT has confronted with many challenges after the end of the Cold War that were not anticipated at the time of treaty negotiation. They started from the former Soviet Union's poor security over its nuclear arsenals and Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program. India and Pakistan, non-parties to the NPT, conducted nuclear tests in 1998. North Korea had been suspected to have a clandestine nuclear weapons program since the early 1990s and declared its withdrawal from the NPT twice, conducting a nuclear test in 2006.

Iran has been working hard to improve its uranium enrichment capability claiming peaceful uses of nuclear energy in spite of strong and repeated demands from the international community to stop it. Libya once had a nuclear weapons program, too.

The terrorists' attacks to the U.S. in September 2001 suggested the high possibility that a terrorist group may use weapons of mass destruction once they possess them. A nuclear black market network operated by A. Q. Kahn was revealed in 2004, through which dangerous behind-the-scenes transactions of nuclear technology, material and equipment were carried out.

With the desire for independent energy security, many non-nuclear-weapon states want to have their own nuclear fuel cycle including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing which have the potential risk of producing nuclear weapons.

Responses to the Challenges

To cope with new challenges, considerable measures have been taken by the international community, in particular upon the initiative of the U.S.⁷.

(1) Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement

Mainly to respond to the case where a state has clandestine nuclear programs that are not declared to the IAEA, like Iraq, the additional protocol was negotiated and adopted at the IAEA as a new legal instrument⁸.

(2) Export Control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The guidelines agreed upon among the members of the NSG have been expanded after the end of the Cold War by including dual use items, the threat of diversion to nuclear terrorists, and introducing a catch-all regulation. These guidelines are politically binding among the members.

(3) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The PSI under the leadership of the U.S. in 2003 envisions the interdiction of the shipment of weapons of mass destruction, by taking actions to board and search any vessel that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargo, and to seize such cargo⁹.

(4) UN Security Council Resolution 1540

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which demands member states to adopt and enforce laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, possess or use weapons of mass destruction¹⁰.

(5) Global Partnership

The G8 Global Partnership was agreed at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit as a follow-up to the Nuclear Threat Reduction (NTR) program in place since 1991 as a cooperative enterprise to deal with the issues of non-proliferation, disarmament, terrorism and nuclear safety in former Soviet Union¹¹.

(6) Iraq War

The Iraq War was a conspicuous example of the U.S. counter-proliferation policy, based on the misguided perception that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and Iraq had connections with Al Qaeda. Lacking the authorization by the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. action is generally regarded as illegal under current international law¹².

(7) U.S-India Nuclear Deal

The U.S. regards this structure as a way to involve India in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the deal is completely unbalanced, because India would be admitted as a nuclear-weapon state without undertaking any obligation towards nuclear disarmament, for example, to sign the CTBT or to stop producing nuclear material for weapons¹³.

U.S. Attitudes

The above-listed measures have been taken mainly upon the initiative of the U.S. Administration. Generally speaking, the policies under President Bush tend to emphasize the immediate effectiveness of the measures taken from the viewpoint of U.S. national interest, rather than to prove their legality or legitimacy for universal support. As a means to accomplish the new measures for non-proliferation, they tended to emphasize the use of military or political power of its own or the coalition of the willing rather than to base their actions on international law¹⁴ or United Nations decisions¹⁵.

As a result, some measures lacking legality or legitimacy could not get universal support and their effectiveness did not materialize. Even if a measure proved legal and legitimate, it could not get support from non-nuclear-weapon states as they regarded the balance of obligations has not been fulfilled because while new measures for non-proliferation were introduced, no progress in nuclear disarmament has been seen.

In particular, criticism from the viewpoint of the three pillars has been strong and the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament has been regarded as one of the main reasons for eroding the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In spite of the fact that the 2000 review conference, based on the decisions in the 1995 review conference, succeeded in adopting a final document by consensus that includes measures in all three pillars in a balanced way, in the review process toward 2005, the U.S. started to express its reluctance to support the 13 nuclear disarmament steps agreed on in 2000. In 2004, the U.S. argued: “we should focus our discussion on nuclear non-proliferation, in particular the violations of non-proliferation obligations, and we should not divert our attention from the violations by focusing on nuclear disarmament as there is no problem in disarmament¹⁶.”

This attitude has led the U.S. to deny the inclusion of the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences as an item of the agenda for the 2005 review conference. That is the one of the main reasons why the 2005 review conference failed.

Y. Sienleij critically analyzes the nuclear non-proliferation policy by President Bush, stating¹⁷:

The Bush Administration has clearly chosen not to rely on the normative multilateral regime for its policy implementation, and opted to pursue other unilateral measures in order to fulfill its non-proliferation objectives....The non-proliferation focus of proposed policies, initiatives and actions of the Bush administration have focused on relegating attention from the two other pillars of the NPT: disarmament and access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy....The United States should take responsibility and exercise leadership in implementing disarmament measures, including the pursuit of ratification of the CTBT as well as a verifiable FMCT before the notion of disarmament is further relegated.

Similarly, Marianne Hanson concluded: “it is only through a real partnership with the global community that the US can hope to achieve its non-proliferation goals. Instead of rejecting past commitments and creating an atmosphere of antipathy, there is a huge potential in the US for crafting a cooperative and effective response to proliferation. It is not difficult to imagine a world buoyed by a decision taken by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, supporting strongly US proposals such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and other vigorous new ideas to curb proliferation. If seen within the light of a genuine commitment to disarmament and a rejection of double standards, such proposals are likely to be welcomed rather than distrusted by the international community.^{18*}

Selig Harrison emphasizes the importance of nuclear disarmament and delegitimization to curb proliferation effectively, stating; “Why should other countries forswear the nuclear options if the existing nuclear powers are upgrading their nuclear weapons, talk openly of using them in future wars, and no longer give even lip service to the goal of phasing out nuclear armament that was enshrined in Article Six of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT).¹⁹

In the international circumstances where there are severe criticisms of President Bush's nuclear policy that has concentrated its efforts upon measures for nuclear non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, ignoring the other two pillars of the grand bargain, the international community is now suggesting new proposals taking into account the three pillars, in particular emphasizing the importance of nuclear disarmament as a way to repair and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and secure a more peaceful world.

A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

“ A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” in January 2007

An article “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nan was published in The Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007²⁰. They endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.

The article is the first prominent proposal appearing in the 21st century after almost a decade-long silence on the demand for nuclear abolition. In that sense the article is valuable, but the article is worth serious analysis because not only does it take account of the new phenomena in the 21st century, that is, the emergence of nuclear terrorism and new nuclear powers, but also the authors are not peace activists or researchers but strong supporters for nuclear deterrence during the Cold War era.

According to their analysis, nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international peace and security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. But reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. The world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. They mention the following four factors as reasons for their conclusions.

Firstly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. Non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy.

Secondly, new nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches.

Thirdly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. However, non-nuclear-weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Fourthly, strong non-proliferation efforts such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocol are under way. The negotiations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran are crucially important. But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger.

In response to the increasing danger inherent with the factors above, as the first and most important measure, the authors argue that a major effort should be launched by the United States to propose a positive framework for disarmament through concrete stages. First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage.

In order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, the authors list the following eight measures as groundwork for it:

- (1) Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time.
- (2) Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
- (3) Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
- (4) Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- (5) Providing the highest possible level of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and HEU everywhere in the world.
- (6) Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee of fuel supply at a reasonable price.
- (7) Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally.
- (8) Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

“ Reykjavik Revisited” in October 2007

On October 24 and 25, 2007, a conference entitled “Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” was held at Hoover Institution, Stanford University to examine the practical steps required to address the nuclear threat and to move toward the

goal established by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at their historic 1986 meeting in Reykjavik²¹. With many former high-ranking U.S. officials and experts on nuclear issues participating, the following agenda was discussed.

- (1) Force reductions and redeployment
 - Further reduction in nuclear forces
 - De-alerting strategic forces
 - Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed
- (2) Controls on nuclear weapons and fuel
 - Preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
 - Controlling fissile materials worldwide: a fissile material cutoff treaty and beyond
 - Securing nuclear stockpiles worldwide
- (3) Test restraints and verification
 - Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and U.S. security
 - Challenges of Verification and compliance within a state of universal latency
- (4) Regional confrontation and nuclear weapons proliferation
- (5) Turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise
 - Intensive work with leaders of countries possessing nuclear weapons
- (6) Getting to Zero

“ Toward a Nuclear-Free World” in January 2008

G. Shultz, W. Perry, H. Kissinger and S. Nunn submitted an article “Toward a Nuclear-Free World²²” on January 15 in the Wall Street Journal again, appealing for the continuity of the project and emphasizing the wide-spread support for their argument.

As short-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 2008, to dramatically reduce nuclear dangers, the following measures are recommended.

- (1) Extend key provisions (such as verification) of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991.
- (2) Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
- (3) Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War era.
- (4) Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic missile defense and early warning systems.
- (5) Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials anywhere in the world.
- (6) Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment.

- (7) Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the NPT as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies.
- (8) Adopt a process for bringing the CTBT into effect.

In addition, the following measures are proposed: developing an international system to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle; agreeing to undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces; and, building an international consensus on ways to deter or, when required, to respond to, secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements.

The arguments in this article preserve continuity with the original, adding the outcomes of the one-year discussions since then, and in particular, listing eight measures that the U.S. and Russia should take beginning in 2008.

“ Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” in February 2008

An international conference on nuclear disarmament titled “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” was held on February 26 and 27 in Oslo, Norway with the sponsorship of the Norwegian Government. This conference aimed at deepening and widening the understanding of the original project, by inviting many experts from all over the world.

Jonas Støre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted his summary and preliminary recommendations²³, in which he offered the following five principles for progress in this global effort.

- (1) Achieving the vision will demand leadership at the highest levels.
- (2) We should begin taking concrete steps now.
- (3) Achieving this must be a joint enterprise among all states.
- (4) We should be faithful to non-discrimination.
- (5) Transparency from both nuclear and non-nuclear states.

From these principles he drew the following conclusions.

- (1) National leaders in all states should engage personally with realizing the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons.
- (2) The United States and Russia should be encouraged to reduce the size of their arsenals significantly.
- (3) Non-nuclear weapon states should co-operate with nuclear weapon states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament.
- (4) All states that possess nuclear weapons should be encouraged to make every effort to reverse their reliance on these weapons.
- (5) Entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is crucial to prevent a new nuclear arms race.

- (6) A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is vital to advance disarmament and prevent proliferation.
- (7) Eliminating nuclear arms requires a robust and credible non-proliferation regime.
- (8) All states that possess nuclear weapons are urged to take all necessary measures to ensure that their weapons do not fall into unauthorized hands.
- (9) We should aim to create a non-discriminatory system of nuclear fuel supply in close collaboration with the IAEA.
- (10) We should consider convening a broadly-based high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament.

The project for a world free of nuclear weapons, which was initiated in January 2007, has been continuously and widely discussed and is getting a world-wide support.

Reactions to the Proposal

Mikhail Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev responded to the proposal of January 4, 2007, saying, “It raises an issue of crucial importance for world affairs: the need for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I feel it is my duty to support their call for urgent action.”²⁴

He calls for a dialogue to be launched within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, involving both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to cover the full range of issues related to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The goal is to develop a common concept for moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

The key to success is reciprocity of obligations and actions. The members of the nuclear club should formally reiterate their commitment to reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. They should without delay take two crucial steps: ratify the CTBT and make changes in their military doctrine, removing nuclear weapons from the Cold War-era high alert.

Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference

The Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference held on June 25 and 26, 2007, prepared one session for “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” and arranged a luncheon keynote speech on “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?” delivered by the U.K. Foreign Minister. Jessica Mathews, a moderator of the session, emphasized the importance of the proposal, saying, “The impact of something that is said or written reflects two things. One is what is said, content. But the other, sometimes even more important, is who says it.”²⁵

At the session, Max Kampelman, who worked for the four wise men’s proposal behind the scenes, emphasized the leadership of the United States, stating: “I believe the United States

can act unilaterally in the following way. I would have the President of the United States appear before the United Nations General Assembly and announce by putting in a resolution that the world should accept the notion that the possession and development of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity and a crime against international body.²⁶

Then U.K. Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett expressed as follows²⁷.

What that Wall Street Journal article has been quite right to identify is that our efforts on non-proliferation will be dangerously undermined if others believe that the terms of the grand bargain have changed, that the nuclear weapon states have abandoned any commitment to disarmament.

What we need is both vision – a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action – progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, both at the moment too weak.

Senator Barack Obama and Democrats' Platform

In an article “Renewing American Leadership” in the July/August 2007 issue of the *Foreign Affairs*²⁸, Obama recognizes as the most urgent threat to the security of America and the world the spread of nuclear weapons, material, and technology and the risk that a nuclear device will fall into the hands of terrorists. He refers to the new proposal by the four wise men, saying, “As George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nun have warned, our current measures are not sufficient to meet the nuclear threat.”

If elected as president, he promises to work for the following measures in order to secure, destroy, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

- (1) To have America lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years.
- (2) To have America work with Russia to update and scale back our dangerous outdated Cold War nuclear postures and de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons.
- (3) To take advantage of recent technological advances to build bipartisan consensus behind ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- (4) To work to negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material.
- (5) To stop the spread of nuclear weapons technology and ensure that countries cannot build a weapons program under the auspices of developing peaceful nuclear power.

In this article, Obama accepted several proposals for concrete measures toward a world free of nuclear weapons submitted by Schultz and others, but he stopped short of supporting a world free of nuclear weapons.

However, in a speech in Chicago, Illinois, on October 2, 2007, he clearly expressed his support for the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, stating²⁹:

Here's what I'll say as President: America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons. We will not pursue unilateral disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we'll retain a strong nuclear deterrent. But we'll keep our commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the long road towards eliminating nuclear weapons. We'll work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert, and to dramatically reduce the stockpiles of our nuclear weapons and material. We'll start by seeking a global ban on the production of fissile material for weapons. And we'll set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.

In addition, on July 24, 2008, he made a public speech before an audience of 200,000 in Berlin, Germany, stating, "This is the moment to begin the work of seeking the peace of a world without nuclear weapons."³⁰ He very clearly supports the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.³¹

The Democratic Party adopted its platform "Renewing America's Promise" on August 25, 2008 at the Democratic National Convention, and it includes a world without nuclear weapons, stating³²:

America will seek a world with no nuclear weapons and take concrete actions to move in this direction. We face the growing threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or the materials to make them, as more countries seek nuclear weapons and nuclear materials remain unsecured in too many places. As George Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn have warned, current measures are not adequate to address these dangers. We will maintain a strong and reliable deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, but America will be safer in a world that is reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminates all of them. We will make the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons a central element of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

The Democratic Party also clearly supports the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, citing the names of the four wise men who advocate the vision.

Senator John McCain and Republicans' Platform

In his article, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom: Securing America's Future" in the November/December issue of the Foreign Affairs, John McCain referred to the collapse of the

nuclear nonproliferation regime because of the mistaken assumption that nuclear technology can spread without nuclear weapons eventually following. Then he argued that the next U.S. president should convene a summit of the world's leading powers to revisit the notion that non-nuclear-weapon states have a right to nuclear technology, to reverse the burden of proof for suspected violations of the NPT, and to substantially increase the IAEA's annual budget³³.

He, at this early stage, focused only on how to rescue and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, with no reference to nuclear disarmament.

On March 2008, John McCain made a speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on the importance of nuclear disarmament, stating³⁴:

We should work to reduce nuclear arsenals all around the world, starting with our own. Forty years ago, the five declared nuclear powers came together in support of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and pledged to end the arms race and move toward nuclear disarmament. The time has come to renew that commitment. We do not need all the weapons currently in our arsenal. The United States should lead a global effort at nuclear disarmament consistent with our vital interests and the cause of peace.

On May 27, 2008, he spoke on nuclear security at the University of Denver, Colorado, stating³⁵:

A quarter of a century ago, President Ronald Reagan declared, "our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." That is my dream, too. It is a distant and difficult goal. And we must proceed toward it prudently and pragmatically, and with a focused concern for our security and the security of allies who depend on us. But the Cold War ended almost twenty years ago, and the time has come to take further measures to reduce dramatically the number of nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals. It is time for the United States to show the kind of leadership the world expects from us, in the tradition of American presidents who worked to reduce the nuclear threat to mankind.

It is not clear whether McCain really supports the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, as he did not mention nuclear disarmament at all in the initial stage, and he emphasized the reduction of nuclear weapons but did not show a clear support for it in the later stage.

The Republican Party adopted its 2008 Republican Platform at the 2008 Republican National Convention on September 1, 2008 and under "Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation" stated³⁶:

The greatest threat we face – nuclear terrorism – demands a comprehensive strategy for reducing the world’s nuclear stockpiles and preventing proliferation. The U.S. should lead that effort by reducing the size of our national arsenals to the lowest number consistent with our security requirements and working with other nuclear powers to do the same. In cooperation with other nations, we should end the production of weapons-grade fissile material, improve our collective ability to interdict the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and ensure the highest possible security standard for existing nuclear materials wherever they may be located.

The Republican Party does not refer to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, though it recommends the reduction of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the production of weapon-grade fissile material.

Other Supporters

This proposal has been widely supported by former officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors, including Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell.

John Kerry, the 2004 Democratic presidential nominee, explaining that both main party candidates have agreed to put America on a path towards a world without nuclear weapons and all the risks they bring, recommends the next president to take the following four actions within six months of taking office. First, within the first 100 days, the next president should give a policy address demonstrating his commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Second, create a new position: a Deputy National Security Advisor to the president, whose sole responsibility is to prevent nuclear terrorism. Third, empower this individual to lead an accelerated effort – a Manhattan project in reverse to secure all loose nuclear material. Fourth, work to extend the 1991 strategic arms reduction treaty, reach a new agreement reducing strategic nuclear forces resulting in no greater than 1,000 deployed warheads, and increase warning times prior to launch³⁷.

Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind and David Owen, former foreign secretaries of the United Kingdom, and George Robertson, a former NATO secretary-general, express their support for the vision by the four wise men, stating “Substantial progress towards a dramatic reduction in the world’s nuclear weapons is possible. The ultimate aspiration should be to have a world free of nuclear weapons. It will take time, but with political will and improvements in monitoring, the goal is achievable. We must act before it is too late, and we can begin by

supporting the campaign in America for a non-nuclear world.³⁸

The NPT and Nuclear Disarmament

There are two main reasons why the nuclear-weapon states should seriously take nuclear disarmament measures for a successful 2010 review conference and also for a more peaceful and secure international community. First, the three pillars, that is, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should be treated in a balanced and equitable manner. Second, for a new non-proliferation measure to get support from non-nuclear-weapon states, it is necessary for the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their obligation of nuclear disarmament.

The Three Pillars of the NPT

In the review process of the NPT, there has been a consensus among parties that the treaty rests on the three pillars and the importance of balanced, full and non-selective application and implementation of the treaty has been stressed. It is also generally agreed that non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing.

Under the Bush administration, the U.S. was very active to take various measures to repair and strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. However, they concentrated their effort on the measures which would directly and effectively prevent proliferation in the short term, rather than to mobilize international consensus through international law or the United Nations.

As a result, almost no efforts have been made to take nuclear disarmament measures which are one of the three pillars and a very important element in order to collect support for the NPT from non-nuclear-weapon states. The U.S. attitude, which concentrated its efforts on only the non-proliferation aspect, ignoring the disarmament aspect, is generally interpreted as one of the main reasons why the 2005 NPT review conference failed.

This is the very important background for why the proposal “a world free of nuclear weapons” was submitted in 2007 and has been widely supported worldwide. The proposal is analyzed as “an important implied critique of the Bush administration’s limited nuclear arms control and reduction efforts which have no long-term vision and shun mutuality of obligations³⁹.”

Nuclear Disarmament to Get Support for Nuclear Non-proliferation

Non-nuclear-weapon states sometimes oppose new measures for non-proliferation not necessarily because it would jeopardize their peaceful nuclear activities, but mainly because it would impose a new obligation to them while the nuclear-weapon states have not fulfilled their obligation of nuclear disarmament. This point is very important for the nuclear-weapon

states to take into account when they take new measures for non-proliferation.

It means that their opposition is not from a technical, but from a political point of view. In many cases, they have no technical basis for nuclear activities that are proposed to prohibit, such as uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing.

What is important is to get support from the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states that have no intention to have nuclear weapons but are reluctant to support new kinds of non-proliferation measures due to their disapproval at the unbalance of obligations.

Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament

In parallel with this argument for the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, we should also make efforts to take practical steps for nuclear disarmament as soon as possible, even before the 2010 review conference.

As practical steps for nuclear disarmament, we should agree on and implement the following measures as soon as possible.

(1) De-alerting of Deployed Nuclear Weapons

It is urgent to change the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

(2) Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons

It is crucial to continue to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them. As the START I Treaty is going to expire in 2009 and the Moscow Treaty will also expire in 2012, the U.S. and Russia should agree upon a legally binding post-START arrangement as soon as possible, based on the agreement on April 6, 2008 in Sochi.

(3) Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Weapons

It is vital to eliminate short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. The U.S. and Russia should commence the negotiation of the withdrawal of NATO tactical nuclear weapons and the reduction of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

(4) Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

It is critical to initiate a bipartisan process with the Senate to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by taking advantage of recent technical advances, working to secure ratification by other key states.

(5) Halting the Production of Fissile Material for Weapons

It is significant to halt the production of fissile material for weapons globally and start negotiations on a FMCT as soon as possible.

(6) Negative Security Assurances and No First Use of Nuclear Weapons

It is imperative to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies; the nuclear-weapon states should give legally binding negative security assurances and pledge no

first use of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

Since G. W. Bush became a president in 2001, U.S. security policy has stressed military and political power with unilateral initiatives, emphasizing non-proliferation and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, President Bush did not regard international law or decisions through the United Nations as important, and ignored nuclear disarmament. The 2005 NPT review conference was a failure mainly because of these U.S. attitudes toward the international nuclear order.

The new proposal of January 2007 seems to be a critical response to the nuclear policy of the Bush administration. The proposal is different from many previous proposals in the sense that it attracted many people including candidates for the Presidential nomination and because the authors of the proposal are bipartisan former high-ranking officials and a senator who were once the strong supporters of nuclear deterrents during the Cold War era.

In order to have a successful 2010 NPT review conference and achieve a more peaceful and secure world by strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, we have to make efforts in the following areas.

Firstly, the parties to the NPT have to discuss the three pillars in a balanced, full and non-selective way during the third session of the preparatory committee in 2009 and the review conference in 2010. The U.S. approach focusing only on nuclear non-proliferation, although it has some successes, has not yielded enough positive outcomes for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Secondly, the nuclear-weapon-states have to take concrete measures for nuclear disarmament as listed above. It is true that four nuclear-weapon states have been reducing their nuclear arsenals and the total number of nuclear weapons is now one third compared with the Cold War era. However, the nuclear-weapon states are modernizing their nuclear weapons and not decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.

Thirdly, by fully comprehending the mutually reinforcing nature of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the states parties to the NPT should work for both purposes, having a goal of the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Endnotes

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